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«La brutalidad del acontecimiento fue total, hasta el extremo de que puede afir-
marse que la guerra civil carlista estalló a consecuencia de la sucesión americana.
Si Fernando VII hubiera sido capaz de retener las posesiones de America, éstas hu-
bieran mitigado, con sus envíos de metales preciosos y sus enormes posibilidades
comerciales, la contracción producida en la economía española por la guerra de
lndependencia y la fase depresiva de la coyuntura.»
Jaime Vicens Vives, Manual de historia económica , 3rd ed., p. 555.
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL FRAMEWORK
From the time of the Spanish Conquest the American colonies were of paramount impor-
tance to the Basques in several major socioeconomic areas: 1) as sources of colonial goods;
2) as outlets or markets for Basque manufactures, namely, iron wares; 3) as key regions for ca-
pital formation and the “repatriation” of significant profit revenue drawn from trade, mining,
land ownership and other economic and social activities; 4) as places for employment in the
royal and clerical bureaucracies, in the military and in the private sectors; and 5) as generators
in the metropolis of business, shipping an other marine-related enterprises. A substantial part
of the region’s manufactures was transported to America through an efficient network of Bas-
que entrepreneurs, often employing Basque ships, captains and crews. Hence, in tangible and
complex ways, the Basques were substantially dependent upon the Spanish overseas pos-
sessions. Therefore, the movements for emancipation across the Atlantic and the territories’
eventual political independence were necessarily bound to have serious repercussions
throughout the Basque region.
The loss of the American colonies, among others, disrupted traditional lines of communi-
cation, upset age-old business and commercial relationships, and increased foreign competi-
tion. In fact, after 1810, the Basques were faced with a rapid loss of revenue/capital, a noticea-
ble decline in colonial goods and a drop in colonial markets. These unfavorable developments
were probably most evident in 1) the profound crisis faced by Basque iron products and other
manufactures in the aftermath of the war of independence and overseas turmoil, and in 2) the
stagnation of Basque commerce with the colonies. As might be expected, all of this led to a
pervasive socioeconomic crisis and to a decline in prosperity among the Basque. Ultimately
too, the chain of events would have a serious impact upon the local body politic, as members
of the provincial elites struggled to preserve intact institutional structures without yielding to the
winds of change and the calls for reform —e.g., state proposals to create and/or increase taxes
in the region to offset the loss of colonial revenue.
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This paper proposes to examine these questions —broadly and within the constraints of
time and space— and, more specifically, 1) how the Basques interpreted their own changing
situation vis-a-vis the colonies; 2) their reactions to the ongoing historical shifts: 3) the role the
Fueros (provincial liberties) in the Basques’ general response. In a larger sense, I propose to
link these questions to significant political and socioeconomic regional dynamics that in my
opinion contributed powerfully to the gestation and development of Basque Carlism.
THE BASQUES IN THE COLONIAL WORLD
As many contemporaries were well aware during the ancien regime, capable and ambi-
tious Basques-some of them well-educated-spilled out of their own region continually for ot-
her parts of the peninsula and colonies. This was by no means a totally voluntary migration.
Basque males —the younger ones in particular, that is, the segundones or second sons—
found themselves pushed out of their provinces by a combination of inheritance laws which fa-
vored the older sons and daughters, inadequate employment opportunities in the small local
administrations, insufficient land, and a host of other socioeconomic factors. This outward mo-
vement, however, proved vastly beneficial to the Basque Provinces as a whole. Significantly,
not only was demographic tension relieved but Basque success outside their region proved
nothing short of phenomenal. In nearly every enterprise, endeavor and occupation, Basques
managed to work their way to the top of society with a mixture of unrelenting drive, industrious-
ness and ingenuity —ruthlessness too sometimes added their detractors. Together, they for-
med the backbone of the Basque diaspora, a tight network possessing vast socioeconomic
power and political influence.
Kinship ties, ethnic solidarity and attachment to the patria chica  (village, province and re-
gion), contributed no small part to the Basques’ irresistible advance in the New World. Juan
Antonio de Zamacola, the Vizcayan afrancesado , vividly underscored these considerations in
his landmark and rich (if inexplicably much overlooked) Historia de las Naciones Bascas:
“Se aman los Bizcaynos y los otros Bascos con una afición extremada adonde
quiera que la fortuna los conduzca, y se ligan tan estrechamente entresi para soco-
rrerse unos a otros, que más parecen individuos de una sola familia, que naturales
de una provincia. Particularmente se ve esta virtud en grado superior entre los Biz-
caynos que han marchado a las diferentes regiones de America, y que todavía con-
servan el uso de la lengua Bascongada: entre ellos se juntan, y como estan forma-
dos con unas mismas máximas de educación y virtud, no pueden estar jamás sin
que los una aquel amor fraternal, que enlazó sus corazones en la juventud” (1).
Expectedly, Zamacola proudly extolled the Basques’ colonial achievements:
“Las casas en que pueden dar alguna educación de letras a sus hijos, los destinan
al comercio de España y al de las colonias americanas, donde hacen por lo regular
fortunas más brillantes que los herederos de las haciendas, pero no por esto olvi-
dan jamás a los suyos, antes bien parece que a porfía se ocupan todos en enviar los
caudales que pueden recoger para socorrer las necesidades de sus casas nativas,
cuyo recuerdo permanece en ellos constantemente, y así es que no hay provincias
(1 ) Auch: lmprenta de la Viuda de Duprat, 1818. (3 vols.), 3, p. 55.
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en España y Francia más favorecidas de caudales de América que las regiones
Bascas” (2).
In fact, in addition to the continual “repatriation” of overseas, capital, aided by strong colo-
nial connections through native sons, by relations with foreign suppliers and shippers, by the
provincial Fueros and other important commercial freedoms, and by the lack of effective go-
vernment controls in the region during much of the ancien regime, the commercial oligarchies
were able to attract to the Basque Provinces from America a wide array of merchandise at fairly
reasonable prices. These colonial goods came to the Basque region legally, via Cádiz, Santan-
der, Bayonne, Bordeaux (and other ports), but often as well illegally (by land and sea), through
multiple and sophisticated smuggling channels, For all of these reasons, both in the Old World
and in the New, Basque industriousness and determination were much admired (3). Regional
antagonists, however were considerably less charitable toward the Basques, labeling them
cliquish and clanish, and quick to band together to promote each others’ welfare at the ex-
pense of the larger Spanish collectivity or commonweal (4).
However viewed by others, given their prominence in the New World on the eve of the Na-
poleonic occupation (and subsequent important events), the stakes for the Basques —indeed
formany other Spaniards as well— in America were enormous. Among the many to recognize
this was the Vizcayan representative at the Assembly of Bayonne, Juan Jose Maria de Yan-
diola, who appealed in June 1808 to Napoleon for the preservation of the Basque constitution.
What made this petition particularly remarkable —and in fact prophetic— was Yandiola’s expli-
cit linkage between the maintenance of the Basque Provinces’ political institutions and privile-
ges and the continued control of the colonies:
“Todas estas estimables qualidades desaparecerían sin el noble entusiasmo de su
constitución cuia observancia es tanto más interesante quando se advierte que la
maior parte de las Américas esta poblada por Vizcaynos, Guipuzcoanos y Alabeses
que gozan de la más distinguida consideración por sus talentos, por sus virtudes y
por sus quantiosísimos caudales. Si estos idólatras de su Pays saben que su consti-
tución ha sido religiosamente guardada en el nuevo orden de cosas, qual será su
influencia para la conservación de aquellas importantes colonias que tan digna-
mente ocupan la augusta atención de V.M.Y. y R. y la de toda España?” (5).
Yandiola’s concerns were hardly unfounded. In fact, the profound interrelationship bet-
ween the colonies and the Basques was continually underscored —albeit unwillingly— by the
(2) Ibid., vol. 2, p, 260. (All of the emphasis, unless otherwise noted, is mine).
(3) Lucas Alamán enthusiastically praised the Basques’ drive and discipline. For a memorable passage from the
classic Historia de Mejico (Second Edition. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1968), see vol. 1, p. 15.
(4) For more on this opposition see Renato Barahona, “Regional Attitudes and Conflicts in Ancien Regime Spain:
Basques and Castilians Revisited”, Journal of Basque Studies, vol. 4, n.º 1, 1983. More on how Basques were per-
ceived by others in the Early Modern Era in Miguel Herrero Garcia. “ldeología española del Siglo XVII. Concepto
de los vascos”, Revue lnternationale des Etudes Basques, vol. 18,1927, pp. 549-569; and in Ideas de los espa-
ñoles del Siglo XVII. (2nd edition. Madrid: Gredos, 1966) pp. 249-274. Also an Invaluable resource is William A.
Douglass and Jon Bilbao, Amerikanuak. Basques in the New World (University of Nevada Press: Reno, 1975), a
work containing extensive notes and a thorough bibliography.
(5) Archive de la Diputación de Vizcaya (A.D.V.), Sala de Guernica, Noticias históricas de Vizcaya, vol. 1. Yandiola’s
“Exposition” is dated 25 June. It is found in a set of documents entitled “La representación de Vizcaya en la Asam-
blea de Bayona” (pp. 146-173). Thus is a transcript of original materials, apparently the work of Antonio de Trueba
y la Quintana, former archivist and chronicler of the Señorio.
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French during the brutal peninsular conflict. When plans for the annexation —euphemistically
labeled a “reunion” by its proponents— of the Basque Provinces to France arose in mid-1810,
there was widespread local opposition —i.e. Spanish and Basque— to the project. Surprisingly,
some resistance also came from French quarters. Cognizant of Basque influence in the colo-
nies, Laforest, Napoleon’s ambassadorto Madrid suggestively observed: “L'Amerique est per-
due si l'Ebre est cédé" (6). However, if plans for Spain’s dismemberment were thwarted, the ca-
taclysms that shook the Hispanic world after 1808 sparked a chain of events culminating in the
loss of the bulk of Spain’s American possessions.
EFFECTS OF THE PENINSULAR WAR ON THE BASQUE PROVINCES
As most of the peninsula, the Basque region was badly battered by the French occupation
and anti-Napoleonic struggle. At war’s een much of the countryside was abandoned, farms
were run down, and many of the legendary Basque ferrerías (forges and ironworks) and other
manufactures lay in ruins and were deserted (7). Indebtedness was the norm for many of the
rural classes and village communities, and trade was stagnant and disorganized after years of
truncated relations with the rest of the peninsula and colonies. Heavy damage had been done
at the sauce —and, by extension, at the outlets/markets— to key components of the Basques’
colonial structures. Other causes not directly related to the war also contributed to the plight of
Basque iron, among them 1) an increased foreign competition —at home and abroad— and 2)
a panoply of unfavorable government policies (in the form of tariffs and administrative blocka-
ges) (8). Along with the loss of important colonial markets, these factors effectively accelerated
the ferrerias’ decline and that of other local manufactures traditionally oriented toward Ame-
rica. An 1815 petition of the Vizcayan Diputacion detailed neatly the many-sided problems
confronting the region’s iron production:
“La fábricas de hierro, que son su verdadera y mayor riqueza, se hallan en el mayor
abatimiento por mantenerse obstruida su extracción a las Americas, y no tener sa-
lida aún para los puertos de la península donde introducen los extrangeros su hie-
rro a un precio tan bajo, que no puede entrar en su concurrencia el de este país por
ascender a mayor cantidad su primitivo coste en las mismas fabricas” (9).
In sum, beyond the immediate and short-term consequences, the war and occupation ac-
ted as potent agents of change, leaving in their wake far-reaching and complex political and
socioeconomic legacies. Among the most significant was the loosening of longstanding over-
seas metropolitan controls and political authority that would ultimately lead to the emancipa-
tion of the American colonies.
( 6 ) Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres Paris (A.M.A.E.), Correspondance Diplomatique, Espagne, vol 683,
letter of 27 September 1810, folios 346-348. More on this question elsewhere in this volume and in the next one.
(7) Around 1800 Vizcaya may have had 140-160 ironworks, although by 1807-1808 possibly as many as 20-25 of
them were already inoperative. This decline was sharply accelerated by the Napoleonic invasion, the coup de
grace from which the ferrerías never fully recovered. A post-war testimony asserts that by 1815 only 50 ironworks
so may have been in operation, with total productron dropping steadily.
(8) See Romeo Flores Caballero. Counterrevolution: The Role of the Spaniards in the independence of Mexico,
1804-1838. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979, pp. 55-56 and 71-72. The question of return migration
from Americato the Basque region during the 1810-1840 period, a neglected area, sorely needs additional atten-
tion and research.
(9) A.D.V., Sala de Guernica, 1813 y 1814, 15 y 16. Copiador de Repesentaciones al Gobierno, petition dated 30 De-
cember 1815.
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THE AMERICAN INSURRECTIONS AND THE FIRST RESTORATION (1814-1820)
The insurrectional movements in the colonies posed severe challenges to Basque so-
ciety. The American turmoil disrupted to an extraordinary degree traditional lines of communi-
cation and business relationship between the metropolis and the colonies; led to the forfeiture
of colonial revenue, goods and markets; exacerbated an existent crisis in iron products and ot-
her local manufactures; caused a sharp increase in smuggling; closed overseas outlets and
possibilities in private and public employment; and, in the long run, contributed to a decline in
the Basques’ generally high standard of living. Probably no one was more acutely aware of the
impact of the new political realities and economic situation across the Atlantic than ferrerías’
owners and others with interests in this sector (10). There is little doubt that Basque iron manu-
factures had depended heavily on colonial outlets:
“Nuestras ferrerías se mantuvieron en un estado regular hasta la guerra de la inde-
pendencia; porque sus productos hallaban un mercado seguro en America, y eran
también admitidos libres de derechos en el vecino Reyno de Francia, circulando
del mismo modo en todas las provincias nacionales. Con posterioridad no solo se
perdideron aquellos mercados por los trastornos que esperimentaron nuestras co-
lonias de Ultramar, y las trabas que opusó la Francia a su importación para aquel
Reyno, sino que empezó tambien a ecsigirse un recargo sobre ellos al paso por el
Ebro para espenderlos en el interior de la Peninsula” (11).
Despite the convulsions and socioeconomic changes (and possibly hoping for a quick
return to normalcy), most Basques stubbornly defended the status quo and the regional liber-
ties the board, even at the risk of continued economic blockages and discriminatory policies
on the central government’s part. A case in point: following the War of Independence, the Fer-
nandine administration requested emprestitos (loans) in part, to finance its colonial ventures.
Some of these were addressed to the Consulados and commercial centers. However, the Bas-
que commercial and political elites strongly resisted these loans, commonly invoking the Fue-
ros.
Apparently, the elites were not interested in the forceful reconquest of the rebellious terri-
tories. Perhaps the Basques, who because of the regional and provincial privileges had never
possessed legally enfranchised ports for direct overseas trade, felt confident enough about
their connections, capital and expertise to seek an accommodation along “neocolonial” lines
under the new (if highly) adverse conditions. In other words, even though Basques had been in
the forefront of colonial activity, they had never been fully legally incorporated into the Spanish
overseas commercial monopolies. Among others, this had forced the Basques to seek other
(often illegal) arrangements and channels of trade. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the
Basque oligarchies, in their role as outsiders, were not interested in reconquering territories,
which, no matter how essential to their well-being, had never completely and/or formally be-
longed to them (12).
(10) Unable and unwilling to recoverthe overseas possessions by force—an idea toward which the Vizcayans, indeed
most Basques, were cool— there was painfully little the region could do except to seek favorable treatment from
the central government and improve home iron production for greater competitiveness.
(11) A Nuestra Señora Dona Isabel II Reina Constitucional de las Españas, lOs ferrones de las Provincias Vasconga-
das y la Navarra. lmprenta de la Viuda de Mendizabal: Tolosa, 1844, pp. 7-8.
(12) Strikingly, in the countless Basque petitions to the central government of the period—aftermath of the War of Inde-
pendence and throughout the 1820s— I have been hard pressed to find a single reference to the need or desirabi-
lity of reconquering the American territories.
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Nevertheless, the notion that the Basques must be willing to sacrifice some local privile-
ges in exchange for the benefits derived from national integration was steadily making head-
way in the region among some manufacturers advanced sectors of the commercial bourgeoi-
sie. In December 1819 a group of iron producers from Arratia (Vizcaya) noted that as long as
Basque products were not regarded in the same manner as all national ones, “the industry and
factories will never be able to prosper” in the region. Oblivious to repeated Basque objections,
however, in August 1819, the central government reaffirmed longstanding tariffs on the region’
iron products upon entering the tax-paying provinces. In short, during 1814-1820 —in part, to
curb smuggling— the ministry objectively treated Basque manufactures as foreign commodi-
ties (13). Far-reaching disputes over these issues would occur during the Liberal Triennium.
AN ATTEMPT AT REFORM: THE LIBERAL TRIENNIUM (1820-1823)
Compounding the region’s economic difficulties, Bilbao and San Sebastian were still not
legally enfranchised (habilitados) for direct colonial trade, a circumstance that added to the
woes of local products. Some Basque businessme’n were convinced that the ports’ enfranchi-
sement would prove beneficial to the manufacturing community. Such an eventuality, howe-
ver, was bound to split ranks in the province, pitting traditionalists —who feared the establish-
ment of customs houses by the sea, presumably in violation of the Fueros-against hard pres-
sed producers looking for much needed outlets —this, ironically, at the time when most colo-
nial markets were closing once and for all to the metropolis. Constitutionalist officialdom in
1820 optimistically predicted prosperity for the Basque Provinces as a result of impending di-
rect trade to America and Asia. The government of the Cortes believed that Basque entrepre-
neurs, attracted by new business opportunities at a time of painfully stagnant trade, would sup-
port constitutionalist economic policies even if this meant enacting reforms previously resisted
in the region. In anticipation of new government tariffs and prohibitions (effective 1 January
1821), Basque merchants rushed to stockpile a wide array of goods destined for the colonies
(cloths, spirits and manufactures), as well as colonial goods (coffee, sugar, cacao and spices),
for the peninsular market. The scramble to stock up was such that the French commercial
agent in Bilbao reported that the entrepots at Bordeaux and Nantes has emptied to fill those of
the Basque region and Navarre (14). The bold gamble would backfire on the region’s entre-
preneurs Basically, merchants were faced with an overabundance of inventory at a time of
stagnant trade. Much to the Basque elites’ dismay the post-Napoleonic international econo-
mic slump continued to take its toll on the region’s trade.
The removal of the inland customs barrier (contrarregistros) exemplified constitutiona-
lim’s attempts at administrative uniformity and national integration, projets shared in large
measure by the powerful Basque economic oligarchy but equally resisted by local conservati-
ves. In other words, Basque reformers were willing to place the Basque region on the same
institutional and administrative footing as the rest of the nation regardless of some of the pro-
vincial privileges that might be relinquished in the process. This underscores the fact that the
(13) lmportant information on Basques muggling in Copia del lnforme de la Junta de Reforma de Abusos de Real Ha-
cienda de las Provincias Vascongadas, creada en Real Orden de 6 de Noviembre de 1875, Madrid: OficinadeTo-
más Jordán, 1839. Interesting observations on Spanish smuggling following the Napoleonic Wars in Jaime Vi-
tens Vives, Manual de historia económica, 3rd ed. Barcelona: Editorial Vicens Vives, 1964, pp. 639-640.
(14) A.M.A.E., Correspondance Consulaire, Bilbao, vol. 3, “Rapport de fin d'année 1820’: 11 January 1821.
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Basque capitalist magnates’ actions were probably motivated more by material self-interest
than by political and ideological conviction. In sum, Basque entrepreneurs embraced consti-
tutionalism in large part as away of ending the economic crisis affecting the region since the
War of Independence. Still, it would be wrong to construe the economic elites’ actions as pu-
rely opportunistic. Rather, they must be viewed as a natural, indeed logical, continuation of the
perennial search for new markets —a process in which the attraction of direct American trade
played a central role. Although Basque constitutionalim’s economic strategy appears to have
been sound, a host of circumstances— foremost among them the continuing business reces-
sion and the upheavals in the New World -combined to thwart its objectives, paving the way as
well to strife at home. Economic difficulties and material hardships, then, as much as political
differences, were at the center of the violent conflicts that erupted during the Trienio. As Vicens
Vives perceptively observed: “La guerra civil fué, desde sus primeros chispazos, en 1821, una
guerra de hambre y de miseria, no una guerra de ricos y potentados” (15). Significantly, some
astute Basque traditionalists were quick to capitalize on the rapidly deteriorating socioecono-
mic situation to rally resistance against constitutionalism. For instance, an anonymous and
clandestine Vizcayan royalist pamphleteer suggestively remarked that the population’s stan-
dard of living would tend to decline under constitutionalism, in part because of the loss of the
province’s commercial franchises. Directed at the heart of the region’s “free-trade” practices,
these arguments’strength cannot be overly emphasized (16). As the forces of international re-
action closed the curtain on Spanish constitutionalism in 1823, not even a second Fernandine
restoration appeared to offer much hope on the colonial front. Now more than ever Basques
would feel the full brunt of the American emancipation. In other words, perhaps for the first time
they had to confront head-on, and cope with the irreversibles loss of the overseas territories
—with the panoply of unpleasant consequences and ramifications that this reality implied.
TOWARD THE FINAL LOSS: THE “ OMINOUS DECADE”  (1823-1833)
During this decade, under the shadow of the colonies’ loss, the Basques faced important
new challenges, among them the following: 1) new centralist requests for contributions and
services, 2) aggravated problems in iron production and distribution, 3) a more pronounced
crisis in their trade, in particular its colonial component and 4) projected government changes
in the legal status of Bilbao and San Sebastian as well as in the region’s customs administra-
tion. On most of these issues, the Basque political and economic elites managed to preserve
the status quo the sacrosanct provincial liberties, although the adamant resistance to reform
led to persistent internal social tension and conflict with Ferdinand VII’s administration.
1) A central administration in dire financial straits, and faced by the loss of overseas reve-
nues, attempted to tap hitherto inaccessible. Basque resources, notably through request for
“voluntary” contributions (donativos) and military services. However, despite steady pressure
and threats (emanating primarily from Ballesteros’ and Zambrano’s departments), Madrid for
the most part was unable to secure the desperately needed assistance (17).
(15) Manual de historia económica, pp. 555-556.
(16) An extensive discussion of this in Renato Barahona,“Politics, Ideology and the Fueros in Vizcaya During the initial
Phase of the Liberal Triennium (1820)”, in Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism, William A. Dou-
glas, editor (Associated Faculty Press. 1985).
(17) Considerably longer discussions of these matters in my Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800-
1833 (University of Nevada Press, 1989) chapter 4 passim.
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2) An important joint 12 June 1824 Basque petition to Ferdinand VII devoted considera-
ble attention to the problems of local iron. Lashing out against centralist “levellers” (nivelado-
res) allegedly bent on national uniformity, the Diputaciones underscored the harmful effects of
insufficient protection against foreign imports, as well as the effects of the loss of colonial out-
lets which, until the Spanish-American revolutions, had been an essential market for Basque
manufactures (18). Another candid and critical assessment of the problems confronting the
region’s products, and in particular iron, is found in the lucid Memoria submitted to the 1827
Vizcayan Juntas by the Diputacion of Pedro Novia de Salcedo and the Marquis of Valde-
espina. The document reiterated the important causes —among them the state of the Ameri-
cas, foreign competition and unfavorable and discriminatory centralist policies— responsible
for the disastrous state of local iron manufactures (19). More explicitly, the preamble to the new
1827 Vizcayan Reglamento de Mineria grimly observed: “La disidencia de los Españoles
Americanos ha causado un golpe mortal a la industria Vizcaina” (20). Essentially, barring ma-
jor improvements in production, the region’s iron sorely needed the ministry’s unconditional
economic and political support. Consequently, having given up hope on the bulk of the colo-
nies, to protect the remaining Spanish outlets, the Basque leardership concentrated instead
on securing two interrelated key objectives: a total ban on foreign iron and the complete ope-
ning of peninsular markets to Basque iron in a tariff-free capacity. To the Basques’ dismay, ho-
wever, the royal administration would not accede to these demands.
3) As long as the Fueros remained, the Basques could expect no favorable treatment
from the central government in matters of trade. Moreover, the Basques —in particular the Viz-
cayans— tenaciously defended the 1727 Patino Conventions (and subsequent amendments)
between themselves and Madrid, which the regional elites had liberally interpreted in advanta-
geous ways. During the decade, to Madrid’s displeasure, Basques insisted on importing many
colonial goods without satisfying all centrally-impose requirements. Nor surprisingly, the cen-
tral administratrion responded with severe new controls against those engaged in outright
smuggling or, more subtly, in the so-called comercio de mala fe. These measures-more strin-
gent certificates or guias, beefed up powers for the Judgeship of Contraband, and others-
contributed strongly to the often troubled relations between the state and the region (21).
The controls could hardly have come at a worse time. As the correspondence of the
french commercial agent in Bilbao shows, the turmoil in the New World and the general eco-
nomic crisis nullified any meaningful foreign trade during 1823-1833. To reactivate a stagnant
trade, the Basques responded with repeated demandsfor direct American commerce. A high-
level conference of Basque delegates at Tolosa in December 1830 succinctly summarized
the regional leaderships’aspirations in a petition to the monarch “demanding two things: free
trade with the colonies and the free importation and circulation in the rest of the kingdom of the
(18) A.D.V., Sala de Guernica, 1823. Representaciones al Rey y otras Autoridades. Another copy of this document in
the register Conferencias de las Provincias Bascongadas. 1812 a 1833.
(19) Memoria de la Diputación general sobre el punto de Minería, in Ordenes Circulares del Señorío de Vizcaya
(OCSV), 1827, pp. 15-16 of the printed version.
(20) Ibid., p. 30.
(21) A 25 February 1824 royal orden in particular contained these harsh provisions: “That the foreign and colonial
goods arriving by land or by sea from the Exempt Provinces and Navarre linto the Contributing [ones], bring pre-
cisely expedited safeconducts destined for the main customs offices, or for the first [point of] entry of the respec-
tive line and, in addition, [carry] certificates as to their origin from the Judge of Contraband of Bilbao and the Sub-
delegates of Guipuzcoa and Navarre, without wich requirement[s] the goods WiII be seized”.
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iron manufactured in these provinces” (22). The representation bitterly complained about the
central government’s tradebarriers that Basques had unsuccessfully tried to remove. Ironi-
cally, claimed the remonstrance, it was easier for french businessmen to introduce colonial
merchandise into Spain through Bordeaux and Bayonne, than for local merchants to exercise
legal trade through San Sebastian and Bilbao. Conspicuously missing from the account, ho-
wever, was the intermediary role of the Basque Provinces in the trade between foreign nations
and the rest of the peninsula —a commerce that often took the form of smuggling. According to
the Diputaciones, the solution to the gamut of problems was simple —if adventageous to Bas-
que economic interest— namely, direct and free trade with America. Unsympathetic to these
demands, Madrid instead chose to pursue a course begun earlier.
4) On 21 february 1828 the central government had legally enfranchised Bilbao and San
Sebastian for colonial trade, an unexpected move that apparently caught many Basques off-
guard. Bilbao merchants reacted favorably but, as the Vizcayan police admitted, news of the
habilitation was “equally welcome in the rest of the region [...] on account of the impulse that its
depressed commerce will undoubtedlytake with this measure and the advantages that will ac-
crue to its manufacturing industry and to the relations that its inhabilitants conduct with those
of the Spanish possessions in the Americas” (23). Strangely, this communique did not report
the opinions of the pro-fueros stalwarts who controlled the Diputación. And they, in defense of
the liberties, dreaded the institutional changes thrust upon the Basque Provinces by Madrid.
Not surprisinglytherefore, the ports’ enfranchimsement, eagerly awaited by powerful entrepre-
neurs (desirous of ending restrictions and expanding overseas trade), swiftly ran into stiff tradi-
tionalist opposition, and the project was in deep trouble from the outset. A crucial sticking point
was the eventuality of customs bureaus by the sea and border. Revealingly, the Consulado of
Bilbao, ostensibly predisposed to the port’s enfranchisement, was put on the defensive by Viz-
cayan conservatives who firmly opposed a change in the bureaus sites. Claiming that its mem-
bers were “Vizcayans before being merchants”, the influential body faced the delicate (and
perhaps impossible) task of supporting the enfranchisementwhile convincing skeptics that no
alterations to the Fueros would ensue. As matters became mired in controversies over the pri-
vileges, the results of the ports’ new status proved exceedingly disappointing or nil. Failure to
achieve the habilitacion in 1828 was a blow to the Basque entrepreneurial and manufaturing
sectors which were forced to continue doing business under bothersome centralist cons-
traints.
No significant developments ocurred in the commercial sphere until San Sebastian’s No-
vember 1832 enfranchisement for colonial trade. Why the royal administration chose this port
while excluding Bilbao remains largely unknown, although possibly the measure was a calcu-
lated slight to reiterate centralist disapproval with Vizcayan recalcitrance on trade matters. Af-
ter an uneasy period of observation, the Diputaciones finally objected to San Sebastian’s en-
franchisement in March 1833. Instead, in a familiar refrain, the Basques pleaded for free trade
with the colonies without transfer of the customs offices to the sea and borders. In essence,
when the Diputaciones successfully resisted the 1828 and 1832 enfranchisements, the Bas-
ques were saddled with the continuining disadvantage of not being able to unload colonial
(22) A.D.V., Sala de Guernica, Conferencias de las Provincias Bascongadas. 1812 a 1833, session of 11 December
1830: and Sagarminaga, Gobierno, 8: 85-88.




goods legally at their ports. More to the point, their political victory was also a clearcut econo-
mic defeat.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the breakup of the old other the Basques enjoyed substantial interests in America.
Kinship, regional ties, industriousness and ambition, and export-oriented economy and ser-
vice to the monarchy had propelled them to some of the highest echelons of the colonial world.
The Napoleonic Wars and the emancipation movements in the New World (within the frame-
work of the crisis of the old order), severely affected the Basques colonial standing. In the pro-
cess, irreparable harm was done to vital economic sectors linked to the colonirs, namely, iron
manufactures and overseas trade. Nevertheless, despite the high stakes, the Basques as a
whole showed remarkably little enthusiasm for the rebellious territories’ “pacification”. Pos-
sibly, the political elites may have felt that the region could continue doing business as before
without institutional changes and modifications in the liberties. Fundamentally, despite the
winds of change and the radically altered relationships across the Atlantic, the traditionalists
who controlled the Diputaciones during the period —except of course for the Trienio— fervently
wished to preserve the status quo. And this, even in the face of a stern economic crisis that ca-
lled for political and administrative reforms enacted in Madrid or promoted domestically. There
is considerable evidence —doubtless in need of further empirical corroboration and a more
precise theoretical framework— that the loss of the colonies had a markedly negative impact
on Basque society —e.g., increase in unemployment and marginality and, in general, a decline
in the population’s standard of living, particularly that of the lower urban and rural classes,
groups that would form the mainstay of Carlism.
A final note: the above is far from the last word on the question. Quite the opposite, it
should only the beginning. Considerable work remains to be done both on the Basques’ role in
the metropolitan control of the colonies and on how the 19th century American emancipations
in turn specifically impacted upon the Basque Provinces. This author is deeply persuaded that
as we learn more about these crucial topics we will be in an incomparably better position to
comprehend the complex makings of Basque Carlism, a historical process in which, judging
by even the most recent accounts, the colonial dimension is strangely and unpardonably mis-
sing.
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